Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall: The Law of Freedom by Finkelman, Paul
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 2 Symposium on the Law of Freedom Part 
I: Freedom: Personal Liberty and Private Law 
Article 2 
December 1994 
Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall: The Law of 
Freedom 
Paul Finkelman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Finkelman, Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall: The Law of Freedom, 70 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 325 (1994). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol70/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
"LET JUSTICE BE DONE, THOUGH THE HEAVENS MAY
FALL": THE LAW OF FREEDOM
PAUL FINKELMAN*
In May 1772 Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of King's
Bench in England, heard preliminary arguments in the case of James
Somerset, a Virginia slave who claimed his freedom under English
common law.1 Charles Stewart, Somerset's master, wanted to send
the slave to Jamaica to be sold. Somerset sought a writ of habeas
corpus to escape this fate. This action brought the legality of slavery
before the highest court in Great Britain.
Lord Mansfield contemplated the possible results of this case. If
he allowed Stewart to return Somerset to the colonies, then slavery
might be considered legally established in England. Recognizing slav-
ery would violate every principle of English law and justice, while the
social and legal results would be immense. Mansfield might have
been willing to allow Stewart to remove Somerset from England, but
"[the difficulty of adopting the relation, without adopting it in all its
consequences, is indeed extreme; and yet, many of those conse-
quences are absolutely contrary to the municipal law of England."'2
As Chief Justice Holt, Mansfield's predecessor, had declared seven
decades earlier, "the common law takes no notice of negroes being
different from other men. By the common law no man can have a
property [interest] in another .... ,,3 Recognizing slavery in England
would undermine or fundamentally alter the common law.
On the other hand, if Lord Mansfield declared Somerset to be
free there would be vast economic consequences. The Chief Justice
estimated there were about 15,000 slaves in England at the time, each
worth at least £50. Thus, "a loss follows to the proprietors of above
£700,000 sterling. How would the law stand with respect to their set-
tlement; their wages?"'4
There would also be legal ramifications if Somerset was set free.
Mansfield wondered, "How many actions for any slight coercion by
* Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. Somerset v. Stewart, 1 Lofft 1, 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 499 (K.B. 1772).
2. Id. at 17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
3. Smith v. Gould, 2 Ld. Raym. 1274, 1274-75; 92 Eng. Rep. 338 (Q.B. 1706).
4. Somerset, 1 Lofft at 17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
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the master" would result from a decision in favor of freedom.5 He did
not spell out the social implications, but surely he knew them. Eng-
land was a homogeneous society. What would happen when 15,000
free blacks remained in the society?
Faced with this dilemma, Mansfield suggested that the parties set-
tle the case. A voluntary manumission, perhaps in exchange for some
money or further service as a servant, might have solved the problem.
But Charles Stewart was adamant; he wanted to keep his slave.6 Thus,
the case went forward with the warning from Mansfield: "If the par-
ties will have judgment, fiat justitia, ruat coelum"7-let justice be
done, though the heavens may fall.
In the next term, Mansfield ordered Somerset be set free. He
declared that "[s]o high an act of dominion" 8 as the master's control
over a slave had to be recognized by law, and not merely by custom.
In language that must have thrilled Somerset's abolitionist counsel,
Lord Mansfield declared that:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive law,
which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and the
time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory: it's
so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive
law.9
The heavens did not fall, but certainly the chains of bondage did
for many slaves in England. Moreover, Somerset would also serve as
the precedent for freeing slaves in a number of jurisdictions outside of
Great Britain. 10 Yet, Somerset did not bring immediate freedom to
all slaves in England; as late as the 1830s at least some blacks were
probably enslaved in Great Britain." And, Somerset surely had little
5. Id. at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
6. Stewart was backed by attorneys from the great sugar interests in England, who had a
large stake in the outcome of the case; Somerset in turn had pro bono representation from the
leaders of the antislavery movement in England. The great abolitionist Granville Sharp initially
intervened on behalf of Somerset. William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legiti-
macy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 86 (1974); DAVID BRION
DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823 (1975).
7. Somerset, 1 Lofft at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509. Mansfield translated this as "let justice be
done, whatever the consequences." Id. However, the proper translation is even more appropri-
ate: "Let justice be done, thought the heavens may fall."
8. Id. at 19, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
9. Id.
10. For American applications of Somerset see, among others, Commonwealth v. Aves, 35
Mass. (18 Pick.) 25 (1836); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). See generally PAUL
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981).
11. In Rex v. Allan [The Slave, Grace], 2 Hagg. 94, 166 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm. 1827), for
example, Lord Stowell of the High Court of Admiralty ruled that a slave who had lived in Eng-
land and then returned to Antigua was not free. Obviously Grace Jones had been treated as a
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immediate impact on most of the Empire, where slavery existed for
another half century. 12
I. AMERICAN FREEDOM FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR
Justice Mansfield's decision in Somerset exemplifies the complex-
ity of the law of freedom. First, it illustrates that the law of freedom
was directly tied to the law of slavery. Thousands of slaves in England
gained their freedom in the 1770s, even as their New World counter-
parts continued to toil in the sugar plantations of the Caribbean and
the rice and tobacco fields of the mainland colonies. However, only a
few years after Somerset, in the wake of the American Revolution,
some of those held in bondage in the recently independent mainland
states also gained their freedom.
During the American Revolution many Americans were troubled
by the existence of slavery. Legislation across the emerging states re-
flected this discomfort. In what became the American South, new
laws allowed for private manumission. Thus, a few fortunate slaves
gained their freedom from masters who took seriously the ethos of the
American Revolution or were convinced that their eternal salvation
was tied to how well they followed the ethic of the Sermon on the
Mount on earth. 13 In parts of the North even more slaves gained their
liberty through individual acts of patriotism or faith. More impor-
tantly, all the new northern states took steps to end human bondage
altogether. In a few states all slaves gained their freedom instantly;
14
in others gradual emancipation acts meant that, while no existing
slaves would gain their freedom, their children would be free at birth,
subject to an apprenticeship.' 5
slave in England in 1822 before she was taken back to the colonies. DAVIs, supra note 6, at 499.
See also SLAVERY AND BlrrisH SocETY, 1776-1846 (James Walvin ed., 1982).
12. In Part II of this Symposium, Anthony Phillips discusses the ways in which the freedom
that did come to the British Caribbean was limited and constricted. Anthony De V. Phillips,
Emancipation Betrayed?: Social Control Legislation in the British Caribbean (with special refer-
ence to Barbados), 1834-1876, 70 Cmn.-KEwr L. REV. - (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of
this Symposium).
13. "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise." LuKE 6:31
(King James).
14. Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1784), and the Fourteenth State, Vermont (in its
first constitution of 1777 and later when it entered the Union in 1791).
15. Pennsylvania (1780), Rhode Island (1784), Connecticut (1784), New York (1799), and
New Jersey (1804) passed gradual emancipation acts. Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. CXLVI, 1780 Pa.
Laws 296; Act of Feb. 25, 1784, 1784 R.I. Pub. Laws 6; Act of Feb. 15, 1804, 1804 N.J. Laws 251.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
A. Freedom and Free Blacks in the South
During the Revolution a few southern slaves served in the patriot
army and gained their freedom. Still others joined the British army,
which offered freedom to any slave willing to serve the King. Others
escaped in the chaos of war. Most slaves who became free during this
period, however, became free through the acts of their masters.
1. Manumission in the South
In 1782, while the Revolution was still winding down, Virginia
passed legislation permitting masters to voluntarily free their slaves,
and allowing those newly free people to remain in Virginia. 16 At that
time about 2,000 free blacks lived in Virginia. By 1790, the figure had
risen to 12,766, and it continued to rise to 20,124 in 1800 and 30,570 in
1810.17 In the three decades after the Revolution, the free black pop-
ulation in Virginia grew much faster than the slave population, 18 and
in fact, free blacks "were the fastest-growing element in the Southern
population."' 19 Some of the growth in the free black population was
due to natural increase, but the bulk of it came from manumissions.
Many Virginia slaveowners took advantage of this law to manumit
some or all of their slaves.
Between them, John and Jonathan Pleasants, two Virginia
Quakers, manumitted over 100 slaves. They tried to manumit their
slaves in their wills, but various heirs who had gained custody of the
slaves resisted the will. Through the persistent efforts of their execu-
tor, Robert Pleasants, 20 these wishes came to fruition. In Pleasants v.
Pleasants Virginia's highest court upheld the wills, despite the fact that
they probably violated the rule against perpetuities. 21 In the 1790s,
16. Ch. LXI, 1782 Va. Acts 14 (authorizing the manumisison of slaves).
17. St. George Tucker estimated that there were 2,000 free blacks in Virginia in 1782, when
the state legalized private manumission. Virginia's more than 200 percent increase in free blacks
from 1790 until 1810 far outstripped the growth rate of slaves or whites. Similar growth rates
occurred in other states. In Maryland, free blacks grew to one quarter of the entire black popu-
lation in this period. By 1810, free blacks outnumbered slaves in Delaware. This growth rate
included some natural increase, but the bulk of this population came from manumissions, which
continued in Virginia in large numbers until at least 1805. IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MAS-
TERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 46-50 (1974). See also ROBERT MCCOL-
LEY, SLAVERY AND JEFFERSONIAN VIRGINIA 71 (2d ed. 1973).
18. MCCOLLEY, supra note 17, at 71.
19. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 49. This percentage growth in free blacks occurred despite
the fact that South Carolina imported more than 80,000 new African slaves between 1803 and
1808.
20. Robert was the son of John Pleasants and the brother of Jonathan Pleasants.
21. Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call.) 270 (1799). For a discussion of the likely violation
of the rule against perpetuities, see PAUL FINKELMAN, LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A
CASEBOOK 116-23 (1985).
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Robert "Councillor" Carter manumitted his more than five hundred
slaves and provided them with land and housing. 22 George Washing-
ton freed all of his slaves in his will and "provided for apprenticeship
and tenancy for the able-bodied and lodgings and pensions for the
aged. '23 Carter and the Pleasants family members were motivated by
strong religious beliefs which were tied to Revolutionary sentiments.
Washington's opposition to slavery, however, was more firmly rooted
in his revolutionary principles.
Most southerners did not, of course, emancipate their slaves in
the wake of the Revolution. Racism and economic self-interest
proved too powerful. Most southern whites could not imagine sharing
their world with free blacks.24 Nor were they willing to share the
"unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happi-
ness" 25 with their bondsmen, on whom they depended for their life-
style. Thus, while freedom came to a few lucky southern slaves, the
law of freedom in the South was constricted and confined. Virginia
and a few of her neighbors allowed for voluntary, private manumis-
sion, but that was about all.
2. The Legal Regulation of Freedom
in the Post-Revolutionary South
Those southern slaves who became free were decidedly not equal
citizens. Whether they, or their free-born children, were citizens at all
remained an open question. Under "traditional principles of law, un-
questioned since the seventeenth century" there were strong argu-
ments for "the conclusion" that free-born blacks "were entitled to
claim citizenship by birthright. '26 Indeed, "within the context of the
general assumptions governing the concept of citizenship, there
seemed to be no theoretically consistent way to deny" free blacks "the
rights and privileges of citizens. ' 27 But, most of the South, and some
of the North, was unwilling to consider blacks citizens. Free blacks in
22. Mary Beth Norton et al., The Afro-American Family in the Age of Revolution, in SLAv-
ERY AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 176 (Ira Berlin & Ronald
Hoffman eds., 1983); GERALD W. MULLIN, FLIGHT AND REBELLION: SLAVE RESISTANCE IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VIRGINIA 70 (1972). BERLIN, supra note 17, at 59;
23. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 59. Under his will, Washington's slaves gained their freedom
at the death of his wife. JOHN CHESTER MILLER, WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
SLAVERY 107 (1977).
24. This, of course, would remain a problem after the Civil War.
25. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).





the post-Revolutionary South had some rights. In North Carolina,
they could even vote until 1835.28 But in general, the law of southern
freedom was limited and narrow.
In the years following the Revolution, conditions became increas-
ingly difficult for free blacks. Often the laws regulating free blacks
were folded into the laws regulating slaves.29 Where the laws differed
for the two classes, the distinctions were often minimal. For example,
the Louisiana Territory made it a capital offense for either a slave or a
free black to burn "any sacks of rice, corn, or other grain, or produce
... or maliciously burn or destroy any building" or to rape "any white
woman or girl."'30 However, free blacks would be tried by an ordinary
court while slaves were tried by a special court.31 In Norfolk, Virginia,
slaves had a 9 p.m. curfew in the summer and an 8 p.m. curfew in the
winter; free blacks could be on the streets as late as 10 p.m. all year
long.32 Ira Berlin summarized the restrictions on free blacks in the
ante-bellum South:
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the legal foundation of
white control was set. Southern law presumed all Negroes to be
slaves, and whites systematically barred free Negroes from any of
the rights and symbols they equated with freedom. Whites legally
prohibited Negro freemen from moving freely, participating in poli-
tics, testifying against whites, keeping guns, or lifting a hand to
strike a white person "except in defense against wanton assault."'33
Free blacks faced curfews, had to carry their "free papers" wherever
they went, and were prohibited from many professions, such as
medicine, dentistry, publishing, pharmacy, and in some places teach-
ing. Like slaves, free blacks were often subjected to whippings-
rather than, or in addition to, jail or fines.34
Free blacks in the South could also face exile or-the ultimate
penalty-reduction to being slaves for non-capital offenses. Most of
the southern states provided for the expulsion or enslavement of free
28. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA 1790-1860, at 110-16
(1943).
29. Typical laws were the following: Act of Feb. 14, 1850, 1850 Ga. Laws 372 (providing for
trial by Superior Courts of Slaves charged with capital offense); Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. 26, 1848
Va. Acts 162, 162-64; Act of Oct. 14, 1852, ch. 6, 1852 Miss. Laws 27 (punishing crime of rape by
slave, free Negro, or mulatto).
30. Act of June 7, 1806, § 7, 1806 ORLEANS TERRrrORY AcrS 198 (prescribing rules and
conduct for Negroes).
31. Id.
32. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 317-18.
33. Id. at 316-17.
34. Id. at 316-340. Virginia, for example, absolutely prohibited the education of free blacks.
Act of Mar. 2, 1819, 1819 Va. Acts 421. See also 54 VA. CODE ch. 199 § 32 (1849) (punishing
people who taught blacks to read).
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blacks who entered their domains from other states or countries. One
common form of such laws were the "Negro Seamen's Acts," which
required that any black sailors entering the state be incarcerated until
their ship was ready to leave. In 1823, in Elkison v. Deliesseline,35
Supreme Court Justice William Johnson failed in his attempt to under-
mine South Carolina's "Negro Seamen's Act."' 36 Johnson declared
that the law unconstitutionally violated the Commerce Clause and the
Treaty Power. But he also found that he lacked the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Henry Elkison, a British
merchant seaman who was originally from Jamaica. 37 Until the Civil
War, almost every southern state continued to bar free blacks from
their jurisdiction, whether they came from the North, from other
southern states, or from other countries. Those blacks violating such
laws faced imprisonment, temporary servitude, or lifetime servitude.
Exile and enslavement were also possible for free blacks who re-
mained in the state where they were born. Virginia's laws illustrate
this. After the Revolution, Virginia experimented with allowing free
blacks to remain in the Commonwealth. 38 However, in 1805 Virginia
backed off from this position, giving any newly manumitted slaves
twelve months to leave the State before they would be reenslaved. 39
Virginia later allowed manumitted slaves to remain in the state for
"acts of extraordinary merit."40 However, the government could re-
voke this permission for "any offence against the laws" of the State. 41
Moreover, in a truly extraordinary provision, the law also allowed the
state to expel "any descendant, however remote, of any such female
slave as may have obtained" permission to remain in Virginia if that
descendant was convicted of "any offence against the laws."'42 Any
blacks remaining in the State more than a year after their right of
residence had been revoked could be sold at auction as slaves.43 In
1837, Virginia modified the standard for allowing a recently freed
black to remain in the State. The new standard demanded that the
35. 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
36. Act of Dec. 21, 1822, no. 2277, 1822 S.C. Acts 461 (regulating free Negroes and persons
of color).
37. Id at 497.
38. Act of May, 1782, Ch. 21, 1782 Va. Acts 39 (authorizing manumission of slaves). See
generally Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TuL L REV. 2063 (1993).
39. Act of Jan. 25, 1806, ch. 63, 1806 Va. Laws 35 (amending laws concerning slaves).
40. Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 111, § 62, 1819 Va. Acts 436 (reducing into one, several acts
concerning slaves, free Negroes, and mulattoes).





slave be of "good character, peaceable, orderly and industrious, and
not addicted to drunkenness, gaming, or any other vice.. . ."" But,
the new law still allowed for the expulsion or enslavement of free
blacks who violated any laws. After 1852, the Virginia Constitution
required that all newly emancipated slaves "be reduced to slavery" if
they remained in the state "more than twelve months after they be-
came actually free."45
Of course free blacks had more rights than slaves. By the eve of
the Civil War, slaves had virtually no rights under the law in the
southern states. They could never legally own property, enter into
contracts, or move about as they wished. Generally, they had no right
to marry, and even when a clergyman performed a marriage ceremony
of slaves, the marriage was not recognized by the law.46 Most slave
states prohibited anyone-including a master-from teaching a slave
to read and write.
With one exception, slaves could neither sue nor be sued in court.
The one exception involved a suit for freedom. Slaves could, and did,
sue for freedom. Such suits, however, always proceeded through the
legal fiction that the plaintiff (slave) was already free. These suits
were usually in the form of a claim for civil damages for assault, bat-
tery, or false imprisonment. The master then responded that the
plaintiff was a slave. The court would then hear evidence on the de-
fendant's (master's) claim. If the court ruled for the defendant master
then the case was immediately dismissed; if the court ruled for the
plaintiff slave, then the civil damage suit would go forward, with token
damages awarded to the slave as proof of his or her freedom.
Free blacks in the ante-bellum South were only slightly better off.
They could generally marry other free blacks and their marriages were
usually legally recognized.47 They could usually move from place to
place within a slave state, but the southern states universally prohib-
ited the in-migration of free blacks from other states. Free blacks
could "make contracts, and dispose of their estates by will." 48 In Vir-
ginia, many owned property, although their status as landowners was
44. Act of Mar. 22, 1837, ch. 70 § 1, 1837 Va. Acts 47, 48.
45. VA. CONST. of 1852, art. IV, § 19.
46. See Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia,
1860s-1960s, 70 Cmn.-KmEr L REV. 371 (1994).
47. ld.
48. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INOUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, § 386, at 313 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1858).
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precarious at best.49 However, as the Georgia Supreme Court in
Bryan v. Walton determined, free blacks were often denied the right
to control their own property. Rather, in that state they could only
buy and sell it through their guardian. 50 In most of the South, free
blacks were subject to a penal code similar or identical to that of
slaves, and thus could never testify against a white person.51 More-
over, as Thomas R.R. Cobb explained in summarizing the laws of the
slave states, free blacks were never citizens but were rather more like
"alien friends" 52 with severely restricted rights:
States, by statute ... deny to them the privilege of bearing arms, to
require of them the selection of a guardian, who shall stand as a
patron, and contract for them; to restrain their acquisition of negro
slaves as property; to place them on the same footing with slaves in
as to their intercourse with white citizens; such as purchasing spir-
ituous liquors, &c. 5
3
By 1860, every southern state prohibited the immigration of free
blacks.54 Southern states believed free blacks threatened slavery and
would have a pernicious influence on the behavior of slaves. Ken-
tucky's 1850 Constitution, for example, directed the general assembly
to pass legislation making it a felony for free blacks to move into the
state.55 Arkansas went one step further, requiring not only that no
free blacks enter the state, but that all free blacks living in the state
migrate elsewhere, or be enslaved.56 No other state adopted such leg-
islation, but it is not hard to envision that the southern states might
have done so if the Civil War had not begun. On the eve of the Civil
War, South Carolina placed enormous pressure on its free black popu-
lation, and forced many blacks who had lived in freedom for their
entire lives to leave the state because they could not prove, at law,
that they were really free.5 7
Thus, the law of freedom in the ante-bellum South turned out to
be something of a charade. The title of the most important book on
49. Ellen D. Katz, African American Freedom in Cumberland County, Virginia (1782-1863),
70 CHi.-KENr L. REV. - (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this Symposium).
50. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 205 (1853).
51. COBB, supra note 48, § 387, at 314.
52. Id. § 384, at 312-13.
53. Id. § 387, at 314.
54. Paul Finkelman, States' Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCER-
TAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125-30 (Kermit L. Hall
& James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989).
55. Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. X, § 2.
56. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 372-73; Act of Feb. 12, 1859, no. 151, 1859 Ark. Laws 175
(removing free Negroes and mulattoes).
57. MICHAEL P. JOHNSON & JAMES L. ROARK, BLACK MASTERS: A FREE FAMILY OF
COLOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 291 (1984).
1994]
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the subject, Slaves Without Masters, says a great deal about the mean-
ing of freedom for southern free blacks from the Revolution to the
Civil War.
B. Freedom and the Revolution in the North
In the North, the American Revolution had a more lasting and
dramatic affect on slavery and the rights of free blacks. During or
immediately after the War, three states adopted gradual emancipation
statutes58 and three states abolished slavery outright.5 9 The rest of the
North joined this trend at the end of the early national period. 60 Cer-
tainly the smaller number of slaves in the North accounts for some of
the support for these laws. But, slavery was economically viable in the
North, even while it was being abolished. However, more was at stake
than mere economic considerations. In Pennsylvania, the long
Quaker and pietistic opposition to slavery finally paid off. In New
England, what was left of Puritan concepts of justice and morality
surely undermined slavery.
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution declared that, "All men are
born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and inaliena-
ble rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety
and happiness. '" 61 This clause of course had an internal contradiction.
The beginning declared that all people were "born free and equal."
But, the clause ended by guaranteeing all people the right to protect
their "property." The first clause implied that slavery was no longer
legal in the state; the second implied that masters might defend and
maintain their slave property.
In 1783, in Commonwealth v. Jennison, Massachusetts' highest
court resolved this contradiction in favor of freedom.62 Massachusetts
authorities had prosecuted Nathaniel Jennison for beating Quock
Walker and forcing Walker to return to Jennison's farm. Jennison
58. Pennsylvania, 1780; Connecticut, 1784; Rhode Island, 1784. Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch.
CXLVI, 1780 Pa. Laws 296: Act of Feb. 25, 1784, 1784 R.I. Pub. Laws 6.
59. Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1784), and the Fourteenth State, Vermont (in its
first constitution of 1777 and later when it entered the Union in 1791).
60. New York (1799) and New Jersey (1804). Act of Feb. 15, 1804, 1804 N.J. Laws 251.
61. MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. I (Declaration of Rights).
62. This unreported case is printed in FINKELMAN, supra note 21, at 36-37. For further
discussion of the case, see ARTHUR ZILVERSMrr, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION
OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 112-17 (1967); and John D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the
Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes on the "Quock Walker Case," 5 AM. J. LEGAL
HisT. 118-26 (1961).
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claimed that he was defending his property rights in Walker, who had
been his slave before 1780. The civil authorities believed Walker had
become free under the 1780 Constitution, and thus Jennison's defense
failed. The Massachusetts court agreed; the right of liberty overcame
the right of property. As a result of the decision, freedom came
quickly in the Bay State; by 1790 the United States census found no
slaves living there. In New Hampshire, a similar constitutional provi-
sion ended slavery by 1800. Vermont, the fourteenth state, explicitly
prohibited slavery in its first Constitution.
In the rest of the North, the law of freedom worked more slowly.
Starting with Pennsylvania in 1780,63 northern states began to adopt
gradual emancipation statutes.64 Connecticut and Rhode Island fol-
lowed in 1784, New York in 1799, and finally, New Jersey in 1804.65
Meanwhile, in 1793 Upper Canada also passed a gradual emancipa-
tion statute.66
Under these laws, all children born to slaves were free at their
birth, subject to an indenture to recompense the masters for the cost
of raising the children of slaves. These laws sought to balance the
property claims of the masters against the natural rights claims of the
slaves. But, the law of freedom had curious results. No slaves living
at the time of the passage of the gradual emancipation acts actually
gained freedom under these laws. Thus, the law of freedom was
something slaves could enjoy only vicariously, through their chil-
dren.67 While their children would eventually be free, they grew up as
apprentices in a form of modified bondage. The period of servitude
ranged from Pennsylvania's 1780 act, which obligated the children of
slaves to serve their masters until age twenty-eight,68 to Rhode Is-
land's law, which fully emancipated the daughters of slaves at age
63. Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. CXLVI, 1780 Pa. Laws 296.
64. See SLAVERY IN THE NORTH AND THE WEST (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989); see generally
ZILVERSMIT, supra note 62; FINKELMAN, supra note 10; GARY B. NASH & JEAN SODERLUND,
FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND ITs AFTERMATH (1991); DAVIS,
supra note 60, at 86-92.
65. Act of Feb. 15, 1804, 1804 N.J. Laws 103 (gradually abolishing slavery); Act of Mar. 8,
1806, 1806 N.J. Laws 106 (repealing third section of abolition act); Act of Nov. 28, 1808, 1808
N.J. Laws 106 (supplementing abolition act).
66. ROBIN W. WINKS, THE BLACKS IN CANADA: A HISTORY 97-98 (1971); Act of July 9,
1793, Laws of Upper Canada.
67. Many of these laws encouraged private manumission and some slaves gained their free-
dom that way. The laws also had various registration requirements which some masters failed to
fulfill, thus leading to the freedom of their slaves.
68. 1780 Pa. Laws 296.
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eighteen and the sons at twenty-one. 69 Upper Canada's gradual
emancipation act provided that the children of slaves serve their
mothers' masters until age twenty-five. 70
The children themselves essentially earned their freedom. Re-
cent scholarship suggests that masters were not only fully compen-
sated for the cost of raising these children, but they obtained some
profit as well.71 Indeed, "[tihe costs to the slaveowners of the gradual
abolition programs... were small."'72 Because they had no long term
interest in the children of their slaves, masters may have worked them
extra hard, thus getting a greater return on their capital investment in
the children of their slaves.73 Furthermore, it seems likely that at least
some masters sold their slaves in the South after the adoption of grad-
ual emancipation laws because they understood that slaves, especially
women of childbearing years, were more valuable in states where their
children would also be slaves.74
Thus, it appears that the law of freedom during the first emanci-
pation did not work as well as it might have. In fact, some of the
states found it necessary to close loopholes or otherwise fine tune
their laws.75 New York took the most dramatic step of all, adopting a
law in 1817 that freed all slaves in 1827. Thus, New York became the
69. Act of Feb. 25, 1784, 1784 R.I. Pub. Laws 6, 6-8. The children of slaves gained their
freedom at the following ages:
Age of Full Freedom
State Date of Law Male Female
Pennsylvania 1780 28 28
Rhode Island 1784 21 18
Connecticut 1784 25 25
New York 1799 28 25
New Jersey 1804 25 21
Robert W. Fogel & Stanley L. Engerman, Philanthropy at Bargain Prices: Notes on the Econom-
ics of Gradual Emancipation, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 381 (1974).
70. WINKS, supra note 66, at 98. Act of July 9, 1793, Laws of Upper Canada.
71. Fogel & Engerman, supra note 69, at 382.
72. Claudia D. Golden, The Economics of Emancipation, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 66, 69 (1973).
73. Id. at 70.
74. In New York, there was an absolute decline in the number of blacks, slave and free,
between 1810 and 1820, which Fogel and Engerman attribute to slaves being sold South. Fogel
& Engerman, supra note 69, at 392. This may not have been the result of gradual emancipation,
but rather of the adoption in 1817 of a law in New York which declared that all slaves in the state
would become free in 1827. Many masters undoubtedly took their slaves out of the state when
they learned that they would become free. In New Jersey, where there was not a threat of total
abolition, the rate of increase of blacks declined by half after passage of the gradual emancipa-
tion law. This suggests that the law led to some removals.
75. Pennsylvania's was the most extensive alteration. Act of Mar. 29, 1788, 1788 Pa. Laws
443-46 (explaining and amending abolition act). New Jersey, for example, passed its first law in
1804 but supplemented it with a series of other acts. Act of Feb. 15, 1804, 1804 N.J. Acts 251
(gradually abolishing slavery); Act of Mar. 8, 1806, ch. 107, 1806 N.J. Acts 668 (repealing section
3 of Act of Feb. 15, 1804); Act of Nov. 26, ch. 31, 1808, 1808 N.J. Acts 112, 112-13 (supplement-
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only state in the North to emancipate a substantial number of slaves
by statute.76 This probably led some masters to remove their slaves
from New York,77 but it also led to the end of bondage for most slaves
in the state.
Despite the complications and the costs imposed on slaves and
their children, the gradual emancipation acts represent an extraordi-
nary change in American law. Indeed, the emergence of the free
North during the early years of the Republic is a tremendous accom-
plishment. Rarely has a master class so peacefully allowed itself to be
voted out of existence. 78 These laws reflected the natural rights ideol-
ogy of the American Revolution as well as the humanitarian and reli-
gious views of many northerners. The preamble to Pennsylvania's
1780 law illustrates the connection between Northern opposition to
slavery and the Revolution.
When we contemplate our abhorrence of that condition, to which
the arms and tyranny of Great-Britain were exerted to reduce us,
when we look back on the variety of dangers to which we have been
exposed, and how miraculously our wants in many instances have
been supplied, and our deliverances wrought, when even hope and
human fortitude have become unequal to the conflict, we are un-
avoidably led to a serious and grateful sense of the manifold bless-
ings, which we have undeservedly received from the hand of that
being, from whom every good and perfect give cometh. Impressed
with these ideas, we conceive that it is our duty, and we rejoice that
it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others,
which hath been extended to us, and release from that state of thral-
dom, to which we ourselves were tyrannically doomed .... We
esteem it a peculiar blessing granted to us, that we are enabled this
ing act of Feb. 15, 1804); Act of Feb. 22, 1811, 1811 N.J. Acts 313 (concerning the aboliton act);
Act of Dec. 3, 1804, ch. 155, 1804 N.J. Acts 460 (supplementing act respecting slaves).
76. Ch. CXCVII, 1817 N.Y. Laws. See generally EDGAR J. McMANus, A HISTORY OF NE-
GRO SLAVERY IN NEW YORK (1966); SHANE WHITE, SOMEWHAT MORE INDEPENDENT. THE
END OF SLAVERY IN NEW YORK CrrY, 1770-1810 (1991)
77. Fogel & Engerman, supra note 69, at 392-93. The same things apparently occurred in
Upper Canada. In 1791, Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe arrived in Canada, as the
acting governor. Simcoe was an avowed opponent of slavery, determined to end the institution.
Shortly after his arrival some masters, in anticipation of abolition in the colony, began to remove
their slaves to sell them in New York where the institution was still legal. While such sales
probably violated New York's laws banning the importation of slaves, they did not violate Cana-
dian law. WINKS, supra note 66, at 96-97.
78. Some commentators have suggested that slavery was dying in the North, and thus ripe
for destruction. In the 1790s, however, at least in New York City slaveholding was on the rise.
"Between 1790 and 1800 there was actually a 22 percent increase in the number of slaves in New
York and a 33 percent increase in the number of slaveholders." WHITE, supra note 76, at 27. In
this period two out of every three merchants in the city owned slaves. Id. at 8. While not a large
percentage of the population, slaveowners were influential. In the North, Revolutionary values
were so strong that even some slaveowners, like John Jay, were active opponents of the institu-
tion. Id. at 10.
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day to add one more step to universal civilization, by removing, as
much as possible the sorrows of those, who have lived in unde-
served bondages .... 79
C. The Meaning of Freedom in the Ante-bellum North
Emancipation did not bring full equality to former slaves and
their children living in the ante-bellum North. In most of the North
they could not vote and they faced segregation in many places. Social
discrimination was everywhere.8 0 Racism was profound throughout
the nation, and most white Northerners accepted the prevailing no-
tions of the racial inferiority of blacks.81
In a variety of ways, however, the North offered African Ameri-
cans substantial freedom. Despite its racism, the North failed to effec-
tively discourage-and often indirectly encouraged-the growth of its
black population. The North did not actively seek black settlers. But,
unlike the South, no states in the North ever expelled their native-
born black population, nor did they even contemplate doing so.82
During this period most northern states indirectly encouraged
black settlers by both protecting their free black population from kid-
napping and also gradually expanded their civil and political rights.
Unlike the slave states, the free states did not harass blacks with com-
plicated laws and vicious enforcement, deny them access to courts of
law, prohibit them from seeking an education, or bar them from vari-
ous types of employment. Most important of all, the North protected
the fundamental rights and liberties of blacks.
Even at the height of antiblack sentiment in the mid-1830s, some
states adopted new laws, or enforced old ones, which helped and pro-
tected blacks. For example, the disfranchisement of black men in
Pennsylvania in 1837 contrasts with the enfranchisement of black men
in Rhode Island in 1842 and the majority vote in favor of black male
suffrage in Wisconsin in 1849. Starting in the 1830s, northern courts
often went out of their way to free slaves in transit from the South.8 3
Such decisions increased the number of free blacks in the North. Sim-
79. Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. CXLVI, 1780 Pa. Laws 227-28.
80. See generally LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE
STATES, 1790-1860 (1961).
81. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE
DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971); WILLIAM R. STAN-
TON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SciENTIFc ATITITUDES TOWARD RACE (1960).
82. See discussion of Arkansas law of 1860, at supra note 56 and accompanying text.
83. Commonwealth v. Ayes, 18 Mass. (Pick.) 193 (1836). The case and its legal progeny is
discussed in FINKELMAN, supra note 10.
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ilarly, from the 1830s on, northern "personal liberty laws" and rulings
by northern judges not only helped prevent the kidnapping and en-
slavement of free blacks, but also protected fugitive slaves living in the
North.8 4 These statutes and court rulings resulted in more blacks liv-
ing in the North.
Furthermore, individual northerners, including people who had
previously not been involved in antislavery activities, took great risks
to protect fugitive slaves.85 The actions of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the litigation surrounding Sherman Booth further under-
scores the way Northerners were willing to preserve the law of free-
dom in their midst. In 1854, Sherman Booth, a prominent editor and
early Wisconsin Republican leader, led a mob in Racine, Wisconsin
which rescued from federal custody the fugitive slave Joshua Glover.
After the rescue United States Marshal Stephen Ableman arrested
Booth. Booth then applied for a writ of habeas corpus from a state
judge. The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted the writ and also de-
clared the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 unconstitutional. The Wiscon-
sin court later refused to send a record of the case to the United State
Supreme Court.8
Everywhere in the North, freedom meant educational opportu-
nity. In some places this education was segregated, in others it was
integrated. The schooling blacks received was sometimes equal to
84. The personal liberty laws were ostensibly passed to prevent the kidnapping and enslave-
ment of free blacks. They often functioned to impede the reenslavement of fugitive slaves. The
laws guaranteed the writ of habeas corpus, or the less common writ of homine replegiando, to
anyone arrested or seized as a slave. In some states, the laws also established procedural re-
quirements for the return of fugitive slaves. See generally THOMAS D. MoRIs, FREE MEN ALL
THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAws OF Tm NORTH, 1780-1861 (1974). In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16
U.S. (Pet.) 539 (1842), the Supreme Court declared such requirements unconstitutional. After
this case, some states limited the use of state facilities in the rendition process and/or prohibited
state officials from participating in the rendition of fugitive slaves. Some state judges, acting on
their own, refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, citing Prigg as their reason for
doing so. Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-slavery Use of
a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIVIL WAR HisT. 5 (1979).
85. On resistance to fugitive slave rendition in general see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
SouRcEs OF ANTISLAVERY CoNsTrruTiONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977); William M.
Wiecek, Latimer: Lawyers, Abolitionists, and the Problems of Unjust Laws, in ANTISLAVERY
RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECrIVES ON THE ABOLrnONISTS (Lewis Perry & Michael Fellman
eds., 1979); Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the Value of "Jus-
tice Delayed", 78 IOWA L. REv. 89 (1992); Paul Finkelman, State Constitutional Protections of
Liberty and the Antebellum New Jersey Supreme Court: Chief Justice Hornblower and the Fugi-
tive Slave Law, 23 Rurrons LJ. 753 (1992); James Oliver Horton & Lois Horton, A Federal
Assault: African Americans and the Impact of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 68 C-n.-KENT L.
REv. 1179 (1993).
86. Exparte Booth, 3 Wis. 145 (1854); In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157 (1855); Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). For a discussion of the case, see Jenni Parrish, The Booth
Case: Final Step to the Civil War, 29 WiLLAMETrE L. REV. 237 (1993).
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that of whites, sometimes it was not. But, everywhere in the North it
was at least possible for blacks to obtain an education. In the South
this was usually impossible. In 1860, for example, Virginia had over
22,000 free black children, aged 6 to 20, but only 41-or 0.2 percent-
of them were in school. Maryland, with over 30,000 free black chil-
dren, did somewhat better: 1,355 or 4.5 percent were in school. In
North Carolina, only 133, or 1.1 percent of the over 12,000 school
aged free blacks, were in school. By contrast, 26.2 percent of New
York's free black children (5,964 of 21,717) were in school. In Penn-
sylvania 7,573 of 19,675 (38.5 percent) were in school and in Ohio
5,671 of 14,202 (39.9 percent) were in school. In New England and
Michigan, an even larger percentage of blacks attended school. In-
deed, a greater percentage of blacks attended school in New England
and Michigan, than did whites in Virginia, Tennessee, or Louisiana.87
The history of ante-bellum black education in Massachusetts and
Ohio illustrates the law of freedom in action in the North. This his-
tory shows that freedom developed over time between the Revolution
and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
In 1798, a private school educated blacks in Boston. In 1800, the
city refused to fund a public school for blacks but by 1820 the city
changed its mind and established a segregated school for blacks. By
the 1840s, most schools in Massachusetts were integrated. Boston,
however, still maintained separate schools for blacks. In 1846, Bos-
ton's black community, led by William C. Nell, petitioned the Boston
School Committee to integrate. This agitation led to the nation's first
school desegregation case, Roberts v. Boston, in 1849.88 Charles Sum-
ner, a leading white antislavery activist and future United States Sena-
tor, and Robert Morris Jr., one of the first black attorneys in the
United States, jointly represented Roberts.8 9 In his brief, Sumner
made constitutional, policy, and psychological arguments similar to
those used in Brown v. Board of Education,90 but unlike the attorneys
in Brown, he was unsuccessful. In the first use of the "separate but
87. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860, at 507 (1866).
Because of the way the census tabulated its statistics, it is necessary to count children up to age
20. Presumably, most children left school at age 15 or 16.
88. Roberts v. Boston, 5 Mass. (Cush.) 198 (1849).
89. For a discussion of Robert Morris, see Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges' Robes
Were Black. African-American Lawyers as Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 174-79
(1994).
90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 70:325
INTRODUCTION: THE LAW OF FREEDOM
equal doctrine," Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw upheld Boston's system
of segregating black children. 91
This defeat before the Supreme Judicial Court did not end the
campaign for integrated schools in Boston. Neither Boston's black
community nor Sumner gave up after Roberts. Rather, blacks in Bos-
ton redoubled their efforts to eliminate segregated schools. A boycott
"reduced black [school] attendance dramatically." Some blacks relo-
cated, "taking advantage of integrated schools in several towns
outside Boston." Meanwhile, blacks petitioned the legislature, which
in 1855 prohibited segregated schools in Massachusetts. 92
The history of black education in ante-bellum Ohio also shows
the evolution of the law of freedom. Although Ohio initially excluded
blacks from the public schools, in 1834 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that mulattoes who were more than one half white could not be ex-
cluded from public schools. By the early 1840s, blacks attended some
Ohio public school, despite prohibitory legislation.93 An 1848 law
allowed communities to create integrated schools if no whites openly
opposed them. In areas of the state where whites protested integra-
tion, the statute provided for segregated education, paid for by taxes
collected from blacks, and school trustees elected by black male tax-
payers. If school districts refused to set up any schools for blacks,
blacks were exempt from all school taxes.94 An 1849 law left the deci-
sion to integrate up to local school boards, thus eliminating the possi-
bility that a few whites could block integration. 95 This law required all
towns to provide some form of public education for blacks, although
segregated schools remained an option for school districts.
91. JIM CROW IN BOSTON: Tm ORIoIN OF THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL DOCTRINE (Leo-
nard W. Levy & Douglas L. Jones eds., 1974); Roberts, 5 Mass. (Cush.) 198; JAMES 0. HORTON
& Lois E. HORTON, BLACK BOSTONIANS: FAMILY LIFE AND COMMUNITY STRUGGLE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM NORTH 71 (1979).
92. HORTON & HORTON, supra note 91, at 74-75; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAw 109-17 (1957).
93. [HENRY BARNARD], SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION ON THE
IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA 370-74 (1871); KENNETH L.
KUSMER, A GmH-rro TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at 16-17 (1976); Williams v.
Directors of Sch. Dist. No. 6, (1834); Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 (1842); Thacker v. Hawk,
11 Ohio 376 (1842); Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 237 (1843).
94. Act of Feb 24, 1848, 1848 Ohio Laws 81 (providing common schools to educate blacks).
KUSMER, supra note 93, at 16-17.




The response to these laws varied. Some communities, such as
Cleveland, immediately integrated. 96 But in some parts of the state,
white hostility prevented integration and in other places blacks were
afforded no public schooling at all. In the late 1860s, many blacks
lived in districts that "still lacked provisions for Negro education. ' 97
An 1856 law required that school funds in Cincinnati be distributed on
a per capita basis. Thus, the segregated schools in that city were par-
tially funded by white taxpayers. Throughout Ohio black teachers
often taught in the state's segregated institutions. 98
The failure of Ohio's antislavery Republicans to create a fully
equal school system is not surprising.99 Ohio's experience illustrates
both the extent of the law of freedom in this area, and also its limita-
tions. The North certainly did not offer blacks equal education. But
developments in the 1840s and 1850s indicate that the trend in the
North was towards greater educational opportunity. Meanwhile, edu-
cational opportunity for southern blacks declined. By 1860, many
southern states absolutely prohibited the education of free blacks. In
1860, more black children attended school in Ohio than in all fifteen
of the slave states combined; more blacks attended schools in Indiana
than in all eleven states which would form the Confederacy. 1°°
By 1860, most northern governments appropriated tax dollars for
black education, a critical indication of the growth in black rights. Put
simply, the North accepted its obligation to educate blacks, even with
taxes collected from whites. This obligation would eventually lead to
the prohibition of separate schools for blacks.
From 1780 to 1860, free blacks could count on fundamental due
process rights to protect their liberty and freedom in the North. In
1860, the important due process right to testify in court without racial
restrictions was available to blacks in all but four northern states. By
1863 this restriction only existed in two states.101 Blacks had equal
96. KUSMER, supra note 93, at 16. Communities in the heavily abolitionist Western Reserve
region of the state also integrated. DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE,
1860-1915, at 191 (1976).
97. GERBER, supra note 96, at 191.
98. Act of Apr. 6, 1856, 1856 Ohio Laws 117 (amending act of Jan. 27, 1853 and Apr. 18,
1854). [BARNARD], supra note 93, at 370-72.
99. Ohio would finally prohibit segregated education in 1887. GERBER, supra note 96, at
193.
100. [BARNARD], supra note 93, at 394. See also BERLIN, supra note 17, at 303-04. Statistics
on schooling of blacks and whites in this period are available in Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the
Fourteenth Amendment Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RuT. L. J. 415, 424-25
(1986).
101. The two states were Indiana and Illinois. Oregon removed its prohibitions in 1862. OR.
CONST. of 1859, art. XVIII; Fred Lockley, The Case of Robin Holmes vs. Nathaniel Ford, 23 OR.
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access to the franchise in all of the New England states except Con-
necticut. If they owned property then they could vote in New York.
Even where they could not vote, they could hold office. John Mercer
Langston, for example, held a number of political offices in Ohio, a
state which limited the franchise to white men.102 Blacks also held
office in other northern states.103 Northern blacks also practiced a
number of professions in the North that were closed to them in the
South. Thus, in the North, there were black lawyers, doctors, dentists,
newspaper publishers, printers, gunsmiths, and other professionals.' 0
4
For these individuals, as well as a handful of successful black entrepre-
neurs, the law of freedom had a meaningful content.
The vast majority of ante-bellum northerners never adopted no-
tions of equality that Americans still strive for today. It would be
anachronistic to expect them to have done so.105 Nor did the laws
they adopted provide for full equality. But by the standards of the
age, the ante-bellum North provided important measures of substan-
tial freedom. The Civil War, Reconstruction, and the adoption of
three Constitutional amendments accelerated a process of expanding
black rights that began well before the secession crisis.
HisT. Q. 111-37 (1922-23); George H. Williams, The Political History of Oregon from 1853 to
1865, 2 OR. HIST. Q. 13, 15-19 (1901); In 1863, the Republican controlled legislature in California
removed that state's prohibition on black testimony against whites. Practice Act, CAL. CODE tit.
11, § 5329-5339. On black testimony at this time, see Finkelman, supra note 100, at 424-25.
102. See Finkelman, supra note 89, at 174 n.90; WILLIAM CHmEK & AIMEE LEE CHEEK, JOHN
MERCER LANGSTON AND THE FiGrr FOR BLACK FREEDOM, 1829-65, at 260 (1989). Ohio courts
had held that people of mixed ancestry who were more than half white were "white" and could
vote. Anderson v. Milliken, 9 Ohio St. 568 (1859); KUSMER, supra note 93, at 7-9. Langston was
of mixed racial background and may have been allowed to vote, but most African Americans in
his district could not have legally voted.
103. ROBERT J. CoTROL, THE AFRO-YANKEES 93 (1981), discusses the election of a black
to an office in Providence, Rhode Island. Although the election was a fluke, Cottrol notes,
"What is most significant is... the fact that he was able to get a grudging measure of acceptance
as he fulfilled his duties for one year." Id By 1850, Massachusetts had a black justice of the
peace. Finkelman, supra note 89, at 174-75.
104. Finkelman, supra note 89, at 171-72.
105. Before the Civil War, most white Americans believed in racial inequality. Scientists of
the time doubted that blacks were even the same species as whites. See generally STEPHEN J.
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); STANTON, supra note 81. Other whites simply be-
lieved that blacks were the same species as whites, but they were racially inferior. See FRED-
RICKSON supra note 81; and the various racially based defenses of slavery in SLAVERY
DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH (Eric McKitrick ed., 1963). While defenders of
slavery were the most adamant about the racial inferiority of African Americans, most, but not
all, northerners accepted at least some of these arguments. Illustrative of the northern position
were the arguments of Stephen A. Douglas in his debates with Lincoln in 1860. During the Civil
War, many northerners opposed the use of black troops because they feared blacks were incapa-
ble of military discipline or bravery. DUDLEY T. CORNISH, THE SABLE ARM: NEGRO TROOPS IN
THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865 (1956); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE NEGRO'S CIVIL WAR (1965).
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Abraham Lincoln partially articulated the ideology of the North
in his 1858 debates with Stephen A. Douglas. Although blacks could
not vote in Illinois, and thus he could not expect any help from them
in winning office, Lincoln nevertheless expressed a belief in funda-
mental equality and fairness that represented the ideology of most
ante-bellum Republicans:10 6
I hold that ... there is no reason in the world why the negro is not
entitled to all the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence-the right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I hold
that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with
Judge Douglas that he is not my equal in many respects, certainly
not in color-perhaps not in intellectual and moral endowments;
but in the right to eat the bread without leave of anybody else which
his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas,
and the equal of every other man.107
II. "THOUGH THE HEAVENS MAY FALL"
Lincoln's appeal to the Declaration of Independence recalls Lord
Mansfield's notion that natural law and justice demanded that free-
dom come to all people. Thus, Mansfield warned the parties in Som-
erset that justice should be done, "though the Heavens may fall." Of
course the heavens did not fall, either when Mansfield declared Som-
erset to be free or when the North ended slavery. However, when
slavery ended in the American South, masters seemed to believe that
the sky had indeed fallen.
Some of the southern response was undoubtedly due to the cir-
cumstances of emancipation. Freedom did not come peacefully to the
American South. Rather, it arrived at the end of the bayonet in the
hands of a liberating army. Moreover, a substantial portion of that
army was made up of former slaves dressed in the blue uniforms of
the United States and armed with the latest rifles.108 The first U.S.
troops to enter Charleston, South Carolina, were from the Twenty-
first U.S. Colored Infantry; the first U.S. soldiers in Richmond were
106. Although, it should be added, he did not believe in complete political or social equality.
107. 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 249 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
108. Approximately 180,000 blacks served in the U.S. army; another 15,000 may have served
in the U.S. Navy. In addition, thousands of blacks served in civilian, non-combat roles, espe-
cially during the early years of the war. Blacks made up about ten percent of the total number of
men who served in the American Army, but blacks were a greater percentage of the Army at the
end of the War. On black participation in the U.S. army, see CORNISH, supra note 105; JOSEPH
T. GLATrHAAR, FORGED IN BATITLE: THE CIVIL WAR ALLIANCE OF BLACK SOLDIERS AND
WHITE OFFICERS (1990); BLUE-EYED CHILD OF FORTUNE: THE CMIL WAR LET-rERS OF COLO-
NEL ROBERT GOULD SHAW (Russell Duncan ed., 1992).
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from the Massachusetts Fifth Cavalry, an all black unit.109 The honor
of entering the capital of the slave republic fell to former slaves and
their freeborn sons.
Scholars have debated whether American slavery was a "peculiar
institution" or not.110 As I have argued elsewhere, "In a number of
ways... United States slavery was simultaneously peculiar and pro-
saic.""' But, there can be no doubt that the circumstances of the end
of slavery were certainly peculiar. The Civil War is the only instance
in human history when the slaveowners revolted to keep their
slaves," 2 as opposed to slaves rebelling to gain their freedom. Fur-
thermore, of all the known slave societies" 3 only in the United States
South did the institution end violently through external force. 1 4
The Civil War was a war about slavery and freedom. It is true
that the U.S. government's initial war aims were to preserve the
Union. It is also true that the South claimed to fight for some abstract
term like states' rights. But, these were subterfuges. On both sides
the leaders understood what was at stake.
A. Northern Views of the War
In his second inaugural, Abraham Lincoln reflected on the causes
of the War: "One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves,
not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern
part of it. The slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All
knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war."115
109. MCPHERSON, supra note 105, at 236-37.
110. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY Vii
(1982); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM
SOUTH 3 (1956).
111. Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Develop-
ment, 68 Cm.-KENr L. REV. 1009, 1009-10 (1993).
112. One might argue that the American Revolution was similar. Surely it was a revolt of
slaveholders, but they were not fighting to prevent emancipation because, despite the Somerset
decision, in 1775 no one in the colonies or London envisioned Imperial interference with New
World slavery. Rather, the English Constitutional structure had fully accommodated slavery in
the colonies. Jonathan A, Bush, The British Constitution and the Creation of American Slavery,
in SLAVERY AND THE LAW (Paul Finkelman ed., forthcoming 1996).
113. Moses I. Finley argued that there were five great slave societies: classical Greece, an-
cient Rome, Brazil, the Caribbean, and the United States South. M.I. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAV-
ERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 9 (1980).
114. The article by Anthony Phillips forthcoming in Part II of this Symposium illustrates the
way slavery was abolished through external legal force. Phillips, supra note 12. Renee Colette
Redman, The League of Nations and the Right to be Free from Enslavement: The First Human
Right to be Recognized as Customary International Law, 70 CHL.-KENT L. REV. 759 (1994), illus-
trates how external forces helped dismantle slavery in the 20th century.
115. Lincoln's Second Inaugural, reprinted in KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 225 (1991).
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The War ended slavery at a horrible cost. More than 600,000
Americans died on both sides. Some 360,000 U.S. soldiers and about
260,000 Confederates lost their lives. While the North lost the most
men, the South suffered the greatest decimation of its population. On
the eve of the war, the United States had three and a half times as
many white men of military age as did the Confederacy. In addition,
before the war ended more than 200,000 free blacks and recently
emancipated slaves served in the U.S. Army and Navy. By the end of
the war only half of all military age men in the United States had put
on a uniform, whereas four-fifths of all southern white men enlisted or
were conscripted. Still, more that 2,100,000 northerners served, as
compared to 800,000 Confederates. 116 Thus, the 260,000 Confederate
deaths represented about a third of the entire rebel army; in contrast,
only 17 percent of the Union Army died. This included a sizable
number of southern blacks and whites from East Tennessee. The
human cost of the war was born most heavily by the losers. Southern
whites paid a terrible price in their futile effort to maintain their right
to own other human beings.
In addition to the human cost, there was the financial and mate-
rial costs. The War devastated much of the South. General William
T. Sherman's brilliant strategy may have turned his name into a four
letter word in Georgia and South Carolina, but his strategy was enor-
mously successful. General Philip Sheridan's dazzling tactics in the
Shenandoah Valley had a similar result: to make it impossible for the
South to carry on the war. Meanwhile, Grant's resolute assault on
Richmond turned much of Virginia into an economic wasteland. Lin-
coln was not far from the mark, when he told his countrymen:
Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this scourge of war
may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all
the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of
unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn
by the lash shall be paid by another drawn by the sword, as was said
three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of
the Lord are true and righteous altogether." 117
Northerners understood, as their marching song "The Battle Hymn
of the Republic" proclaimed, that the war was a crusade against slav-
ery.1 8 Even before Lincoln drafted the Emancipation Proclama-
116. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCrION 181
(1982).
117. Lincoln's Second Inaugural, supra note 115, at 225-26.
118. Julia Ward Howe, Battle Hymn of the Republic, 9 THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY 10 (1862).
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tion,119 Union Soldiers began singing "As he [Jesus] died to make men
holy, let us die to make men free" as they cut through the plantation
South like an avenging angel, liberating slaves as they went.' 20
B. Southern Understanding of the War
Just as Lincoln, and most northerners, understood the true cause
of the War, so too did southerners understand what they were fighting
for. The Confederate Constitution illustrates this. That document
had some features that incorporated concepts of states' rights and lim-
ited national government. However, the Confederate Constitution
was also a document that created a national government with impor-
tant centralizing powers. Like the United States Constitution, the
Confederate compact contained a "necessary and proper" clause, a
"supremacy" clause, and a clause requiring all state officials to swear
allegiance to the national government. Article I, Section 9 of the Con-
federate Constitution contained a provision allowing the suspension
of habeas corpus that was identical to the suspension provision in the
United States Constitution. These clauses illustrate that the Confed-
erate revolution was not about limited government or decentralized
government. Indeed, what is most remarkable about the Confederate
Constitution is how much it mirrored the United States Constitution.
However, in other areas, the Confederate Constitution created a
slaveholders' republic. While prohibiting the African slave trade, the
Confederate Constitution allowed the importation of slaves from
other nations.' 21 The Confederate Constitution absolutely prohibited
any law "imparing[sic] the right of property in negro slaves.. . ." Re-
flecting northern state decisions which had implemented the Somerset
precedent and freed the slaves of visitors, 22 Article IV guaranteed
that the citizens of each Confederate state "shall have the right of
transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves
and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not
be thereby impaired." The Confederate Constitution's fugitive slave
clause reiterated this right. Finally, the Confederate Constitution re-
119. The Proclamation is reprinted in HALL ET AL, supra note 115, at 224. Lincoln first
drafted the proclamation sometime before June 18, 1862; announced it to the public on Septem-
ber 22, 1862, as the "preliminary proclamation;" and one hundred days later promulgated it as
the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Jom-Ni HOPE FRANKULN, THE EMANCIPA-
TION PROCLAMATION 36-37, 58-59 (1963).
120. Howe, supra note 118, at 10.
121. Thus, Africans could have been brought into the Confederacy by way of Cuba or Brazil.
The law of the United States prohibited the importation of slaves from any place.
122. For a full discussion of this issue, see FunKm.tAN, supra note 10.
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affirmed the proslavery holding of Chief Justice Taney's decision in
Dred Scott,12 3 by declaring that slavery could never be prohibited
from any Confederate territories. At the same time the rebel consti-
tution-makers jettisoned Taney's implausible arguments that the na-
tional government could not regulate the territories. The territories
clause thus accomplished two proslavery goals. It guaranteed slavery
in the territories and also guaranteed that the Confederate Congress
could counter any possible antislavery movement that might grow up
in the Confederate hinterlands.
If anyone had any doubts about the pivotal role of slavery in the
creation of the southern nation they would have only had to listen to
the claims of Georgia's Alexander Stephens, the Vice President of the
Confederacy. By southern standards Stephens was a moderate on
slavery, and at least initially an opponent of secession. Nevertheless,
after the southerners wrote their Constitution, he declared slavery and
the inequality of the races to be "the cornerstone" of the Southern
nation.124 He asserted that the Confederate Constitution
has put at rest forever all the agitating questions in relation to our
peculiar institutions-African slavery as it exists among us-the
proper status of the negro in our form of civilization.... Our new
Government is founded ... upon the great truth that the negro is
not the equal of the white man. That slavery-subordination to the
superior race, is his natural and normal condition. 125
III. RACE AND AMERICA'S PECULIAR FREEDOM
Vice President Stephens's justification of the Confederacy-"that
the negro is not the equal of the white man"-goes to the heart of the
problem of freedom in America. For two centuries, southerners had
justified slavery on the basis of race. 126 After the American Revolu-
tion the racial argument became even more critical. American liberty,
as articulated in the Declaration of Independence, was based on the
idea that "all men are created equal" and endowed with fundamen-
tal-"unalienable"-rights. 127 Only by convincing themselves that
123. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
124. Thomas E. Schott, Cornerstone Speech, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONFEDERACY 415
(Richard N. Current ed., 1993).
125. Alexander Stephens, quoted in William M. Wiecek, "Old Tunes There are Not Forgot-
ten": The Distinctiveness of the Southern Constitutional Experience, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADI-
TION: CONSTrTUnONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SouTm, supra note 38, at 159, 173.
126. As early as 1640 Virginia began to pass legislation singling out blacks for special treat-
ment. Act of Jan. 1639-40, 1640 Va. Acts 226. See generally Finkelman, supra note 38 at 2063.
127. THE DECLARAON OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all man are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Id.
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blacks were not included in "all men" because they were not "created
equal" could southerners justify enslaving them.
Leading the charge of inequality was the primary author of the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson. 128 In his Notes on
the State of Virginia, Jefferson argued that political equality for blacks
was impossible because "the real distinction that nature has made"
between the races went beyond color and other physical attributes.
Race, more than their status as slaves, doomed blacks to permanent
inequality. In Notes, Jefferson asserted that a harsh bondage did not
prevent Roman slaves from achieving distinction in science, art, or
literature because "they were of the race of whites"; American slaves
could never achieve such distinction because they were not white. Jef-
ferson argued that American Indians had "a germ in their minds
which only wants cultivation" and they were capable of "the most sub-
lime oratory." But, he had never found a black who "had uttered a
thought above the level of plain narration; never seen an elementary
trait of painting or sculpture." He found "no poetry" among blacks.
Jefferson argued that blacks' ability to "reason" was "much inferior"
to whites, while "in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anoma-
lous," and "inferior to the whites in the endowments of body and
mind." Jefferson conceded blacks were brave, but this was due to "a
want of fore-thought, which prevents their seeing a danger till it be
present."'1 29 Thus, Jefferson could assert the equality of mankind only
by excluding blacks. He admitted some qualms at reaching a "conclu-
sion [that] would degrade a whole race of men from the rank in the
scale of beings which their Creator may perhaps have given them."
But he suspected blacks might be "originally a distinct race, or made
distinct by time and circumstances" and that because of this they were
"inferior to the whites in... body and mind."'130
In the nineteenth century, particularly after 1820, southern politi-
cians, clergymen, novelists, poets, physicians, scientists, and moral phi-
losophers devoted enormous intellectual energy to support a similar
analysis of race. 13' They succeeded in convincing themselves, most
128. For Jefferson's views of race, see generally, Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery:
"Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181 (Peter S. Onuf ed.,
1993); and Paul Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson and Antislavery: The Myth Goes On, 102 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 193 (1994).
129. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138-43 (William Peden ed.,
1955).
130. Id. at 142-43.
131. See generally DREW GILIN FAUST, THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY
THOUoHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH, 1830-1860 (1981); FREDRICKSON, supra note 81; SLAv-
ERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF T OLD SOUTH (Eric L. McKitrick ed., 1963); STANTON, supra
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other southern whites, and probably a majority of northern whites,
that blacks were racially inferior to whites. Consider, for example, the
views of Thomas R.R. Cobb, the most influential member of the com-
mittee that drafted the Confederate Constitution.132 In his treatise on
the law of slavery, Cobb argued that "[tihe mental inferiority of the
negro has been often asserted and never successfully denied."'1 33 He
believed that
[t]he prominent defect in the mental organization of the negro, is a
want of judgment. He forms no definite idea of effects from causes.
He cannot comprehend, so as to execute the simplest orders, unless
they refresh his memory as to some previous knowledge. He is
imitative, sometimes eminently so, but his mind is never inven-
tive or suggestive .... This mental defect, connected with the indo-
lence and want of foresight of the negro is the secret of his
degradation.' 34
Furthermore, Cobb believed that the African heritage of blacks af-
fected their "moral character.' 35 "The degraded situation of the bar-
barous tribes of Africa is well attested by every observer. So debased
is their condition generally, that their humanity has been even
doubted .... 136 Cobb was perhaps more articulate than most white
southerners, but he spoke for his race. By 1861 white southerners uni-
versally accepted the notion that blacks were not-and could never
be-equal to whites.
Thus, when the war came, with freedom as its most important
result, southern whites thought that the heavens had indeed fallen.
Freedom meant more than simply a destruction of the southern eco-
nomic system. It also meant that the southern racial structure had
been turned upside down. Freedom required more than the liberation
of millions of slaves; it also required that millions of blacks be both
note 81; WILLIAM S. JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH (1935); LARRY E.
TISE, PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, 1701-1840 (1987).
132. Cobb is an important figure in southern law. He was the first reporter for the Georgia
Supreme Court. He gained this position through his father-in-law, Chief Justice Joseph Henry
Lumpkin. Cobb was also a teacher at the Lumpkin School of Law, which was the predecessor of
the University of Georgia School of Law. His older brother, Howell Cobb, was a U.S. Congress-
man, Georgia Governor, and Secretary of the Treasury under Buchanan. Until 1861, Howell
Cobb was considered a staunch southern unionist. By 1860, Thomas R.R. Cobb was an avid
secessionist. He was the leading figure in the drafting of the Confederate Constitution. He is
often called the James Madison of the Confederacy. Cobb subsequently served in the Confeder-
ate Army, organizing "Cobb's Legion," and rising to the rank of Brigadier General. He was
fatally wounded at the battle of Fredericksburg, and died in December 1862.
133. COBB, supra note 48, § 22 at 27.
134. Id. § 31, at 35-36.
135. Id. § 32, at 36.
136. Id. § 32, at 36-37.
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integrated into society and also protected from a white supremacist
society.
Early in his career Thomas Jefferson had articulated the southern
white fear of free blacks; to set loose on society a race of "inferiors"
would undermine all social institutions. Thus, he and other slaveown-
ers could never consider emancipation:
Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand
recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new
provocations; the real distinctions which nature had made; and
many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce
convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination
of the one or the other race.-To these objections, which are polit-
ical, may be added others, which are physical and moral. The first
difference which strikes us is that of colour.1
37
The "prejudices entertained by whites" have proved difficult to up-
root. In the years following the Civil War race continued to define
freedom in the South, just as it had defined servitude before the War.
IV. FREEDOM AND REPRESSION IN THE POST-WAR SOUTH
But of course freedom came. By the end of June 1865,138 some
four million former slaves were "freedmen."'1 39 The Civil War meant
an end to society as white southerners had known it. In the last year
of the War, a former slave, proudly wearing Union blue, was guarding
some Confederate prisoners. He noticed that one of the captured en-
emy was his former master. "Hello, massa," he called out, "bottom
rail on top dis time!"' 140 The problem for the next century, however,
was how that new relationship would work out. The master class of
the South was not used to being on the bottom, and had no intention
of staying there for long. As one Confederate veteran remarked after
seeing blacks in uniform, with bayonets and guns: "If I could have my
way, I'd have a rope around every nigger's neck, and hang 'em, or
dam up this Mississippi River with them.' 141
137. JEFFERsON, supra note 129, at 138.
138. Emancipation did not come to Texas until at least the 19th of June; hence in that state
blacks and many whites still celebrate the Lone Star State's most unique, and wonderful, holi-
day, "Juneteenth."
139. 1 purposely use the nineteenth century term "freedmen," fully aware that it has sexist
overtones. However, it was in fact the term used by whites and blacks in both the North and
South. The most important federal experiment in social welfare in the 19th century-and per-
haps in the history of the nation-was the creation of the Freedmen's Bureau.
140. LEON F. LrTWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 102
(1979).




In the next century, thousands of blacks would indeed be hung,
drowned, shot, or in some other way murdered by white southerners
who could not accept the reality of black freedom. 142 Besides lynch-
ing, whites used other forms of violence to intimidate the freedmen
and their descendants, denying them economic and political rights.143
Terrorist violence, while often successful, was messy and could be dan-
gerous. More than a few freedmen shot back when attacked. 1' Al-
bert Jones, a Union soldier remembered that after the War his former
master "treated me like his brother," but he believed this was because
the master "wuz scared of me 'cause I had so much ammunition on
me."1
4 5
Thus, while the white South never rejected violence, violence it-
self was in the end just a means to an end. The end itself was the
political disfranchisement, social subordination, and economic ex-
ploitation of the freedmen. In the end, the preferred method of re-
versing the result of the Civil War was through law. The War was
hardly over when southern legislatures began to concoct methods of
reducing the freedmen to something close to slaves. Whites used law
to control blacks on three levels: the economic, the social, and the
political.
Economically, southern whites wanted to harness black labor for
their own profit while preventing blacks from competing with whites.
Southern whites rejected the notion of "free labor," and if they could
not have slaves, then at least they wanted laws that allowed them to
142. See JAMES H. CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAW (1933). There were 512 blacks
lynched in Georgia and Virginia between 1880 and 1930. W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING
IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 263 (1993). This figure, of course,
omits the huge numbers of blacks lynched from 1865 to 1880. Brundage seems less interested in
politically motivated lynching, and accordingly has not studied Reconstruction and its aftermath.
On violence and Southern legal culture see JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH, 1860-
1861 (1956); EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History,
64 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1985).
143. Christopher Waldrep, Black Access to Law in Reconstruction: The Case of Warren
County, Mississippi, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583 (1994); Donald G. Nieman, African Americans
and the Meaning of Freedom: Washington County, Texas, 70 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 541 (1994);
Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security
and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation, 1865-1910, 70
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 439 (1994).
144. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended To Be Applied to the White
Population": Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity-the Redeemed South's Legacy to a Na-
tional Jurisprudence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. - (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this
Symposium).
145. LrTWACK, supra note 140, at 103.
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compel blacks to work on year-to-year contracts at low wages. Illus-
trative of this attitude was the conversation reported between a north-
ern visitor and a South Carolina planter. "All we want," the planter
declared,
"is that our Yankee rulers should give us the same privileges with
regard to the control of labor which they themselves have." When
pressed for his understanding of northern labor controls, he indi-
cated that laborers were bound by law to make an annual contract
and could be punished for any violations. Told that no such laws
existed in the North, the planter seemed incredulous. "How do you
manage without such laws? How can you get work out of a man
unless you compel him in some way?" The visitor replied that "Nat-
ural laws" sufficed, with the best laborers commanding the best
wages. "You can't do that way with niggers," the planter immedi-
ately retorted.
146
Socially, whites needed to marginalize and segregate blacks-to
put the "bottom rail" back on the bottom, where whites thought it
belonged. This meant creating a society in which blacks were physi-
cally and socially separate from whites, and in which they "knew their
place" and stayed in it. Whites, who otherwise considered themselves
to be law abiding, God-fearing Christians, seemed prepared to do any-
thing to accomplish this goal. As Col. Samuel Thomas, a Freedmen's
Bureau official in Mississippi and Louisiana noted of whites' attitudes
in 1865:
Wherever I go-the street, the shop, the house, the hotel, or the
steamboat-I hear the people talk in such a way as to indicate that
they are yet unable to conceive of the negro as possessing any rights
at all. Men who are honorable in their dealings with their white
neighbors will cheat a negro without feeling a single twinge of
honor. To kill a negro they do not deem murder; to debauch a ne-
gro woman they do not think fornication; to take the property away
from a negro they do not consider robbery. The people boast that
when they get freedmen affairs in their own hands, to use their own
classic expression, "the niggers will catch hell."'147
Initially, there was no need to control the political power of
blacks, because they had no power. At the end of the War no south-
ern state allowed blacks to vote. Thus, the franchise was not initially
an issue. When it became an issue-beginning in 1867 and especially
after the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 18701'm-southern
146. Id. at 365.
147. Id. at 364 (quoting Col. Thomas). Professor Bennett elaborates on this theme in her
article. See Bennett, supra note 143.
148. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
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whites worked hard to undermine and destroy the right to vote.149 By
the early twentieth century they had succeeded in doing just that.' 50
B. The Black Codes
While most of the white South shuddered in horror at the thought
of emancipation and black equality, wily legislators throughout the
former slave states worked to create new laws to suppress the freed-
men. The South first adopted its "black codes" in 1865-66, when the
administration of Andrew Johnson showed more concern for the com-
fort of the former rebels than for the safety of their former slaves.' 51
After the end of Reconstruction the black codes reemerged as segre-
gation statutes. Illustrative of the southern suppression of the freed-
men are laws adopted by Mississippi and South Carolina in 1865.
In 1865, Mississippi and South Carolina, both with black majority
populations but with all-white and unreconstructed legislatures,
passed "civil rights" laws.'5 2 While ostensibly adopted to protect the
rights of the freedmen, these "civil rights" acts were more like modifi-
cations of the ante-bellum slave codes. Mississippi's "Act to Confer
Civil Rights on Freedmen"'153 did more to limit the civil rights of the
freedmen than to enhance them. Other Mississippi laws adopted that
year similarly restricted the rights of former slaves. South Carolina's
law "was in some respects even more discriminatory."'1 54 These acts,
as well as others passed by former Confederate states the next year,
show how limited the law of freedom could be in a regime run by
former slaveowners.155
Section 1 of the 1865 Mississippi Civil Rights Act began with a
grudging acknowledgment that slavery was over. The law allowed
"all freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes" to "sue and be sued, im-
plead and be impleaded," to "acquire personal property" and "dis-
pose of the same, in the same manner, and to the same extent that
149. Xi Wang, The Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870-1872, 70 Cs-n.-KEr L. REV.
- (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this Symposium); Waldrep, supra note 143; Nieman,
supra note 143.
150. Wang, supra note 149.
151. See generally THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965).
152. MICHAEL PERMAN, REUNION WITHOUT COMPROMISE: THE SOUTH AND RECONSTRUC-
TION, 1865-1868, at 78 (1973).
153. Partially reprinted in HALL ET AL, supra note 115, at 232-34.
154. EIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
200 (1988).
155. Id. at 200-16.
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white persons may. '156 This was a substantial change in the law, since
before Emancipation slaves could own no property, and in most of the
South free blacks were severely limited in the kind of property they
could own or who could control it.157 However, following this appar-
ently expansive understanding that private property is a key to per-
sonal liberty, the legislature added: "Provided that the provisions of
this section shall not be so construed as to allow any freedmen, free
negro or mulatto, to rent or lease any lands or tenements, except in
incorporated towns or cities in which places the corporate authorities
shall control the same."' 58 In an overwhelmingly rural and agrarian
society, the whites in Mississippi were unwilling to allow blacks to rent
any farm land. Section 6 of the law similarly limited the economic
rights of the freedmen, by providing that if any freedman left an em-
ployer before an annual contract had expired, "he shall forfeit his
wages for that year, up to the time of quitting."'1 59 Furthermore, if a
black left his employer the freedman could be arrested and returned
to finish the contract.' 6° Anyone capturing such a "fugitive" freed-
man would be entitled to a $5 fee.' 6' Following the War, southern
whites did what they could to provide for the economic as well as the
social subordination of blacks. 162 Southern whites continued to tie
race to economic status, and at the same time, to set the stage for an
era when the wages of whiteness in the South would help to perpetu-
ate inequality. 163
The Mississippi law did grant blacks a few rights. Section 2 al-
lowed blacks to marry each other but section 3 prohibited interracial
marriage.' 64 Section 4 allowed blacks to testify at civil trials involving
whites, but only if a black was also a party, and in criminal trials only
if a white was charged with harming a black.
156. Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 82, 82 (allegedly conferring civil rights
on Freedmen).
157. In Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859) Mississippi's highest court would not allow a
free black woman living in Ohio to inherit property in Mississippi.
158. Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws at 82.
159. Id. § 6, at 84.
160. Id. § 7.
161. Id.
162. Wallenstein, supra note 46; Bennett, supra note 143.
163. Kathleen N. Cleaver, The Antidemocratic Power of Whiteness, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. __
(forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this Symposium) (reviewing DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE
WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991)).
164. Wallenstein, supra note 46; Emily Field Van Tassel, "The 'Bugbear' at Which American
Justice is Frightened": Anti-Miscengenation, the Social Economy of Dependency, and the Debate




The Mississippi legislature did not stop with one law regulating
the rights of the freedmen. An apprentice law, passed the same year,
allowed courts to essentially sell into servitude orphans or children
"whose parent or parents have not the means or who refuse to pro-
vide for and support" them.165 Under "An Act to Amend the Vagrant
Laws of the State,"'166 courts could sell into temporary servitude those
blacks with "no lawful employment or business,"'1 67 or who might "ne-
glect their calling or employment" or "misspend what they earn."16
The penal laws passed that year prohibited freedmen from selling or
possessing liquor, preaching religion without a license, or owning
guns, ammunition, or bowie knives. 169 Slavery may have ended in
Mississippi, but freedom surely had not come. The law of freedom, in
Mississippi looked suspiciously like the law of slavery.
Like Mississippi, South Carolina prohibited freedmen from work-
ing in non-agricultural jobs without paying special taxes that ranged
from $10 to $100. South Carolina also enacted harsh criminal laws to
suppress African Americans. Stealing a hog could lead to a $1000 fine
and ten years in jail. Other crimes had punishments of whipping, the
stocks, or the treadmill, as well as fines and long imprisonment. Hired
farm workers in South Carolina could not even sell farm produce from
their own gardens without written authorization from their employers.
Other provisions of the law created special taxes and fines for blacks
with imprisonment or forced labor for those who lacked the money to
pay them. Like Mississippi, South Carolina also provided for the ap-
prenticing of black children. These, and similar laws, created some-
thing close to a reimposition of slavery in South Carolina. 170
Elsewhere in the former Confederate states the situation was
equally dismal. Florida's 1866 code was as harsh as those of Missis-
sippi and South Carolina. The Florida code provided whipping, the
pillory, and forced labor for various offenses. Florida prohibited any
blacks from moving into the state, prohibited African Americans from
owning firearms, and allowed the creation of schools for blacks, but
prohibited the use of state money to pay for them. Tennessee's crimi-
nal code of 1866 provided the death penalty for breaking and entering
with the intent to rob, for robbery itself, and for horse stealing. This
165. Mississippi Apprentice Law, 1865 Miss. Laws 453.
166. 1865 Miss. Laws 233.
167. Id. § 2.
168. Id. § 1.
169. Penal Laws of Mississippi, 1865 Miss. Laws 165. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 144.
170. 1865 S.C. Acts 246, 246-64 (establishing and regulating the domestic relations of blacks).
[Vol. 70:325
INTRODUCTION: THE LAW OF FREEDOM
law did not use any racial terms, but was clearly aimed at blacks.
North Carolina's law, arguably the least offensive of the new black
codes, nevertheless provided a death penalty for blacks who raped
whites, but not for whites or blacks who raped blacks. 171
Beyond the state legislatures, local lawmaking bodies regulated
the freedmen. These laws looked remarkably like the slave codes of
the ante-bellum period. In Opelousas, Louisiana, for example, "no
Negro was allowed to come within the limits of the town without spe-
cial permission of his employer." 172 This was similar to the ante-bel-
lum regulations of free blacks and Negro seamen's acts. As John
Hope Franklin, one of the nation's premier historians of Reconstruc-
tion, summarized:
Many communities required Negroes to be off the streets by a speci-
fied hour, while others had laws against Negroes using "insulting
gestures" or "exercising the function of a minister of the Gospel"
without a license. Most of the laws employed such terms as"master" and "servant" and clearly implied a distinction that con-
signed the Negro to a hopelessly inferior status.173
As Jefferson might have put it, "Deep rooted prejudices enter-
tained by the whites" had not ended with the institution of slavery.
Indeed, emancipation brought with it new laws that created anything
but freedom.
V. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
Congress responded to the black codes of 1865-1866 with the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Most Republicans believed that the enforce-
ment clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery,
allowed for the passage of this law. As historians Harold M. Hyman
and William M. Wiecek have persuasively argued:
Freedom was much more than the absence of slavery. It was, like
slavery, an evolving, enlarging matrix of both formal and customary
relationships rather than a static catalog. Such assumptions helped
Republicans and their constituents to accept arguments beyond the
Thirteenth Amendment's immediate abolition effect.'74
Not all Republicans were certain that the Thirteenth Amendment
allowed for such expansive protections of civil rights. Thus, John
171. The laws of Florida, Tennessee, North Carolina, and others are discussed in DONALD
G. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 86-98 (1979). See also WILSON, supra note 151, at 106.
172. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFIER THE CIVIL WAR 49 (1961).
173. Id.
174. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 391-92 (1982).
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Bingham and other Republicans pushed for another amendment, al-
lowing for the protection of civil rights.175 This led to the Fourteenth
Amendment which guaranteed "equal protection of the law"176 and
provided powerful negative incentives for enfranchising blacks. 177
However, when these incentives failed, Congress came back to the
states with the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited discrimination
in voting "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."' 78
The law of freedom could only start to appear when Congress
and the nation as a whole acted. This began with Congress sending
the Thirteenth Amendment to the states in early 1865, the passage of
the first Freedmen's Bureau Act in 1865,179 and then the ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment on December 6, 1865. Change contin-
ued with adoption of various laws to protect civil rights'80 as well as
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.' 81 The Constitution of
1787 had been a proslavery document-what the abolitionist William
Lloyd Garrison called a "covenant with death, an agreement in
hell."' 82 The Constitution of 1865-1870-that is the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-was an agreement in heaven,
designed to bring substantive freedom to those who had once been in
bondage.
As many of the articles in this Symposium detail, the results of
this new Constitution were mixed.183 Federal laws and prosecutions
were sometimes successful in slowing down terrorist violence and or-
175. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
103 YALE L.L 57 (1993).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
177. The Fourteenth Amendment provided for the diminution of Congressional delegations
if blacks were not allowed to vote on equal terms with whites. ld. § 2
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
179. Act of Mar., 3, 1865, ch. 90., i3 Stat. 507 (establishing Bureau for Relief of Freedmen
and Refugees).
180. Civil Right Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); First Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch.
153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); Second Reconstruction Act of 1867, Ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867); Third
Reconstruction Act 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); Fourth Reconstruction Act of 1868, ch. 25, 15
Stat. 41 (1868); Ku Klux Klan Force Acts of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Ku Klux Klan
Force Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); Ku Klux Klan Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22,
17 Stat. 13 (1871); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
181. For a discussion of these laws, especially in the context of voting, see Wang, supra note
149.
182. For an elaboration on this aspect of the Constitution of 1787, see Paul Finkelman, Slav-
ery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant With Death, in BEYOND CONIEDERA-
TION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 188 (Richard
Beeman et al. eds., 1987); Finkelman, supra note 111; WIECEK, supra note 85.
183. Nieman, supra note 143; Richard Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice
Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CIn.-KEr L. REv. 627
(1994); Marianne E. Lado, A Question of Justice: African American Legal Perspectives on the
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ganizations, like the Ku Klux Klan.'8 4 Similarly, for a short period the
federal government was able to guarantee the franchise for a substan-
tial number of blacks in the South.185 But, in the end, the federal
government lacked the will to protect black lives and black freedom,
while the Supreme Court proved willing to give only the most minimal
support to the constitutional changes. 186
With the abandonment of the freedmen came the era of segrega-
tion. The abandonment began with the Slaughter-House Cases,187 but
the crucial signal came a decade later in the Civil Rights Cases,
88
where the Supreme Court eviscerated the ability of the national gov-
ernment to protect African Americans from day-to-day discrimina-
tion. At a time when southern states were beginning to exclude and
segregate blacks through statutory regulation, Bradley's language is
particularly striking for its insensitivity to the plight of the recently
freed blacks.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favor-
ite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected. 189
On the heels of the Civil Rights Cases came the Supreme Court's
most famous approval of racial segregation, in Plessy v. Ferguson.190
This case confirmed that the South was free to impose whatever rules
it wanted on African Americans. The tentative movement toward
segregation that had begun in the late 1870s became a way of life, as
southern law makers, at the state and local level, discovered seemingly
endless areas of public and private life that they could regulate in a
discriminatory manner. As Donald G. Nieman has written:
Between 1887 and 1891 most states of the former Confederacy
adopted laws requiring railroads to provide separate but equal ac-
commodations for the races. Then beginning in 1901 with Virginia,
most southern states passed laws requiring urban street railroads to
1883 Civil Rights Cases, 70 C'Fu.-KErN L. REV. _ (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this
Symposium); Wang, supra note 149.
184. Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku
Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L. J. 921, 924 (1984).
185. Wang, supra note 149; Nieman, supra note 143; Waldrep, supra note 143.
186. Aynes, supra note 183; Lado, supra note 183; Wang, supra note 149.
187. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873). Lado, supra note 183.
188. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
189. Id. at 25.
190. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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separate black and white passengers. Finally, during the 1910s,
states and localities created a complex web of regulations designed
to extend the logic of separation to all spheres of southern life. A
number of states forbade whites and blacks to be taught together,
even in private schools, and barred teachers and nurses from serving
students and patients of another race. States and cities established
separate parts and mandated residential segregation. Some states
required manufacturers to designate different entrances for white
and black employees, to maintain separate pay windows, toilets, and
water buckets, and to separate workers by race on the job.191
Laws mandating segregation went far beyond the well-known segrega-
tion of public conveyances, schools, and public facilities. 192 "Whether
by state law or local law, or by the more pervasive coercion of sover-
eign white opinion, 'the Negro's place' was gradually defined-in the
courts, schools, and libraries, in parks, theaters, hotels, and residential
districts, in hospitals, insane asylums-everywhere, including on side-
walks and in cemeteries.' 93 Some segregation statutes were per-
versely creative: Oklahoma required separate telephone booths for
blacks;194 a Georgia statute prohibited blacks and whites from playing
billiards together;195 a Louisiana law required separate entrances at
circuses for blacks and whites; 196 and a local ordinance in New Orle-
ans "segregated white and Negro Prostitutes in separate districts,"'197
although there is no evidence that the law also applied to the patrons
of those districts. Kentucky not only required separate schools, but
also provided that no textbook issued to a black would "ever be reis-
sued or redistributed to a white school child" or vice versa. 98 Florida
raised the ante further, requiring that school books for blacks be
stored separately from those for whites. 199
By the time the United States entered World War I with the fond
hopes of making the world safe for democracy, most blacks in the
South had been disfranchised, and the new lily-white governments
had created two societies:
191. DONALD NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 108-09 (1991).
192. Patricia Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated
Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHL-KENT L. REV. __ (forthcoming August
1995 in Part II of this Symposium).
193. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE ORIoINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 212 (1951).
194. Act of Mar. 30, 1915, ch. 262, 1915 Okla. Sess. Laws 513.
195. Act of Aug. 26, 1925, No. 407, 1925 Ga. Laws 286, 286-88.
196. Act of July 9, 1914, No. 235, 1914 La. Acts 465, 465-66.
197. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 102 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
198. Act of Mar. 16, 1928, ch. 48, 1928 Ky. Acts 183, 187-88.
199. WOODWARD, supra note 197, at 102. North Carolina had a similar law. NIEMAN, supra
note 191, at 109.
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[B]liacks lived in a world circumscribed by signs designating 'white'
and 'colored' facilities. Separate Bibles in courtrooms as well as
separate waiting rooms in train stations served as constant remind-
ers that whites considered them a degraded caste. The signs, to-
gether with the intricate set of laws establishing segregation, made
blacks adapt to ludicrous rules that varied from state to state and
city to city, further underscoring whites' power.
2 ° °
Thus, the South had successfully overturned the law of freedom. Slav-
ery had not been reimposed, but economic and social subordination
had deprived millions of African Americans of their rights under the
Constitution. The covenant remade during Reconstruction in heaven
had been broken on earth.
VI. TOWARD THE MODERN LAW OF FREEDOM
The struggle to overturn segregation, and to recreate the law of
freedom, is complex and long. Even a short review of it is beyond the
scope of this essay or this Symposium. However, a brief look at the
twentieth Century evolution in the law of freedom in two areas-
transportation and voting-illustrates the way in which the struggle to
define and create a law of freedom is still very much a modem issue.
Before turning to transportation and voting, it is necessary to at
least mention the issue of education. This is the best known area of
the struggle for equality. From the end of the Civil War until after
World War I substandard schools 201-or no schools at all 02 -made it
difficult for blacks to compete economically or to muster the leader-
ship and community strength to fight segregation. During this period
the Supreme Court did little to protect black education.20 3 Before and
after World War II successful suits for equal education compelled the
South to integrate a few graduate and professional schools, but did
200. NIEMAN, supra note 191, at 109.
201. "In 1910 eleven Southern states spend an average of $9.45 on each white child enrolled
in their public schools and $2.90 on each black child." By 1916 the average annual per capita
expenditure for black children had declined to $2.89, "but the white per-capita expense rose to
$10.32." RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTicE 88 (1975).
202. In Cumming v. County Board of Education of Richmond Co., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) the
Supreme Court refused to enjoin the operation of a white high school in a Georgia district that
had just closed its only black high school.
203. Id; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 26 (1908) (upholding a Kentucky law requiring
the separation of college students on the basis of race); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927)
(upholding Mississippi school district assignment of a child of Chinese ancestry to a school for
blacks). One good discussion of issues involving segregated schools in this period is J. Morgan
Kousser, Before Plessy Before Brown: The Development of the Law of Racial Integration in
Louisiana and Kansas, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST. LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTruTIONS
213 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991). KLUGER, supra note 201, remains the
single best study of school segregation and desegregation.
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little to dent the massive edifice of Jim Crow public education. 2°4
Brown v. Board of Education20 5 changed all that, but as Davison
Douglas's article in this Symposium shows, even where communities
were moderately sympathetic to the law of freedom, integration was
slow and painful.2°6 Today, the meaning of fair treatment in education
is contested. While most civil rights advocates continue to believe that
integration for its own sake is a good idea, there is no longer universal
support for this notion. Few would dispute the Court's assertion in
Brown that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place" and that "[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal." 20 7 But, just how to achieve equality-how to im-
plement a true law of freedom in education-remains less certain and
clear.
Oddly enough, while we associate the struggle for equality with
education, in recent times greater success has been achieved in the
area of transportation and voting.
A. Civil Rights and Transportation
After Reconstruction the most visible example of the abandon-
ment of the freedman came on trains and streetcars. The Supreme
Court's most famous support of racial segregation, in Plessy v. Fergu-
son,208 upheld a state law requiring separate accommodations for
blacks on railroads,20 9 but of course more significantly contained the
Supreme Court's blessing for virtually all racially based segregation.
In the modem period, transportation was again at the cutting edge of
the fight for true freedom. Ironically, after World War 11 the United
States government sometimes was on both sides of a case. Mitchell v.
United States210 and Henderson v. United States Interstate Commerce
Commission211 involved complaints about segregation on interstate
railroads. Although the discrimination in both cases was based on
204. Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (requiring the University of Mis-
souri to integrate its law school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring the University
of Texas at Austin to integrate its law school); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (requiring the state of Oklahoma to integrate its graduate school of
education). For a discussion of these cases, see KLUOER, supra note 201.
205. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
206. Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the Post-Brown South, 70 CI-n.-KEWr L.
REV. 689 (1994).
207. Brown, 347 U.S. at 487.
208. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
209. Minter, supra note 192.
210. 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
211. 339 U.S. 816, 843 (1950).
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state law and railroad policy, the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") was the nominal defendant. However, by this time the na-
tional government openly opposed segregated railroad cars and ar-
gued against the reasonableness and the constitutionality of the ICC
regulations. Finally, in 1955 opposition to segregated buses in Mont-
gomery, Alabama, ignited the modern civil rights movement in the
deep South. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. emerged out of the Mont-
gomery bus boycott as a national figure.212 The boycott led to Gayle
v. Browder,21 3 which afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to
finally declare that segregation in transportation was unconstitu-
tional.214 Congress reaffirmed this decision, and expanded it to all
public facilities in the Civil Right Act of 1964. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed this in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States215 and Kat-
zenbach v. McClung.21 6 These cases did not end the civil rights
revolution, but they confirmed the idea that the law of freedom would
finally be applied to all Americans.
B. Voting Rights
Like transportation, voting rights have been an aspect of the law
of freedom since the Civil War. In the Fifteenth Amendment the
Constitution promised equal suffrage, without regard to race. For a
while it worked, although blacks who voted in many parts of the South
faced white resistance that could be fatal.217
Blacks continued to vote after Reconstruction, often in the face
of intimidation. But, initially at least, southern legislatures did not
attempt to legally prohibit blacks from voting. However, as the
Supreme Court gave its blessings to segregation, southern whites be-
came bolder in their attacks on black voters. In the 1890s voting re-
strictions, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, dramatically cut down
on the number of blacks who could vote in the South. In 1891, Con-
gress failed to adopt the Lodge Force Bill, which would have given
strong federal protections to black voters in the South.218 This
seemed to signal that the North no longer cared about the fate of
212. See generally DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
213. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
214. Id. See also Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution:t A Legal History of
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
215. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
216. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
217. Nieman, supra note 143; Waldrep, supra note 143.
218. WOODWARD, supra note 193, at 322-23; Wang, supra note 149.
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southern blacks. Soon southern states began to take away the vote
from blacks. In Louisiana, for example, there were 130,344 African
Americans registered to vote in 1896, but after the implementation of
a new constitution in 1898, the number dropped to just 5,320.219 In
Williams v. Mississippi220 the Supreme Court admitted that such con-
stitutional provisions were directed at blacks, but the Court found that
the regulations themselves did not discriminate on the basis of race,
but only on the basis of literacy and ability to pay a poll tax. The
Court accepted the reasoning of the Mississippi Supreme Court that a
literacy test and a poll tax did not discriminate on the basis of race or
previous condition of servitude, but rather they discriminated against
"a patient, docile, people; but careless, landless, migratory within nar-
row limits, without forethought. '" 221 The Mississippi court concluded,
and the United States Supreme Court concurred, that the new Missis-
sippi Constitution did not discriminate "against the negro race" but
only "against its characteristics. '222 The racism of the Mississippi con-
stitution-makers and of the Mississippi Supreme Court was crudely
obvious, but the United States Supreme Court found nothing uncon-
stitutional about it. Thus, in voting, as in schooling and transporta-
tion, the law of discrimination had displaced the law of freedom. 223
With a few exceptions,224 neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
offered any protection to black voting rights until the adoption of the
federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, which the Supreme Court upheld in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach.225
Illustrative of the change has been the growing number of blacks
in Congress. In 1901, the last black Congressman from the South had
departed from the House of Representatives. By the 1940s blacks
from Chicago and New York sat in Congress. Blacks from Michigan
and Pennsylvania entered Congress in the 1950s. In 1969, William L.
Clay of Missouri became the first southern black in Congress since
George White of North Carolina had left the institution in 1901.
Twenty-five years later blacks from ten other southern states had
come to Congress 226 while at the local and state level southern Afri-
219. KLUGER, supra note 201, at 68.
220. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
221. Id. at 222.
222. Id.
223. One exception to this trend was Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) where the
Supreme Court struck down Oklahoma's grandfather clause on Fifteenth Amendment grounds.
224. Id.
225. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
226. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas.
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can Americans had served at every position from alderman to
governor.
C. Toward a New Birth of Freedom
By the end of World War I the American South was not a place
safe for democracy, especially for non-whites. Blacks were dis-
franchised and segregated at every turn. Yet, so anxious were south-
ern leaders to preserve white supremacy that they were willing to
suppress their own civil liberties in order to deny blacks their civil
rights.227 Thus, in 1920 Mississippi made it a criminal offense for any-
one to advocate or publish "matter urging or presenting for public
acception or general information, arguments or suggestions in favor of
social equality or of intermarriage between whites and negroes. '228
By the end of Word War II, however, conditions were beginning
to change. A very different Supreme Court looked at race in a new
way. Prominent in pushing the nation in the direction of racial fair-
ness were southern justices, Hugo Black of Alabama and Tom Clark
of Texas, who had little patience for the intolerance of the region.
Meanwhile, the on-going migration of blacks out of the South had
changed the nature of northern and southern politics. Moreover, the
war against Nazism abroad had made racism at home increasingly sus-
pect. The time was ripe for change-for what Abraham Lincoln had
called "a new birth of freedom. '229
It was in this climate that the Civil Rights movement moved to
the streets while Congress, the executive branch, and most of all the
Courts, pushed for the full implementation of the law of freedom.
The legislative and judicial struggle culminated in Loving v. Vir-
ginia,230 which eliminated the last formal aspect of American race dis-
crimination, the laws against interracial marriage. These laws, first
passed to help create servitude and slavery in the colonial period,
were the last vestiges of the law of slavery. Striking them down, as the
227. Southerners had similarly suppressed civil liberties in the ante-bellum period, by punish-
ing anyone, white or black, who challenged the legitimacy of slavery. See, e.g., RUSSELL B. NYE,
FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860 (1972);
CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGrrr STRUGGLE IN TIm OLD SOUTH (1940); Michael
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: Free Speech,
Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993).
228. Act of Mar. 25, 1920, ch. 214, 1920 Miss. Laws 307.
229. Abraham Lincoln, Final Text, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at
Gettysburg (Nov, 19, 1863), reprinted in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 332
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
230. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Wallenstein, supra note 46.
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Court ultimately did,231 can be seen as the final implementation of the
law of freedom in America. The most enduring statutory vestige of
slavery had been at last eliminated.
Yet, as the twentieth century comes to a close, the issues of free-
dom remain. So too do the symbols of slavery. As Sanford Levinson
shows in Part II of this Symposium, even painful symbolism-such as
the flying of the "Stars and Bars," the flag of the slave Republic of
1861-65-can be useful in helping us to better understand our past
and overcome it.232
VII. THE LAW OF FREEDOM
This Symposium began as a sequel to one in this Law Review two
years ago on the law of slavery.233 The articles in this Symposium
explore various threads of the law of freedom. I initially planned to
focus on the way law helped shape freedom-or failed to shape free-
dom-in the years immediately following the Civil War. Many of the
articles in this Symposium certainly deal with those issues. But, the
concept of freedom is expansive and ever expanding. Thus, the arti-
cles here go beyond the United States234 and beyond the American
South in the last third of the nineteenth century.
Slavery, it turns out, was more resilient than even the most pessi-
mistic ante-bellum opponents would have thought. Before the Civil
War, southern blacks who were not enslaved faced enormous obsta-
cles in maintaining and protecting their freedom.235 After the Civil
War, southern courts heard suits involving pre-war sales of slaves.236
Disputes over contracts lived on after the subjects of those contracts
had been emancipated and turned into free people. Meanwhile,
231. In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (appeal dismissed), the Supreme Court refused to
rule on the constitutionality of miscegenation laws, in a decision Constitutional law professors
have difficulty explaining by any theory of law. See Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Stat-
utes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 Gao. L.J. 49 (1964), reprinted in 5 RACE, LAW,
AND AMERICAN HISTORY: THE ERA OF INTEGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1930-1990, at I (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1992). For further discussion of the issue of miscegenation, see Wallenstein,
supra note 46; Van Tassel, supra note 164; Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
937 (1993).
232. Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on flags, Monuments and State Holidays,
70 CH I.-KENT L. REv. - (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this Symposium).
233. Symposium on the Law of Slavery, 68 CFu.-KENT L. REV. 1005 (1993).
234. Redman, supra note 114; David M. Cobin, A Brief Look at the Jewish Law of Manumis-
sion, 70 Cm.-KErr L. REV. __ (forthcoming August 1995 in Part II of this Symposium); Phillips,
supra note 12.
235. Katz, supra note 49.
236. Andrew Kull, The Enforceability After Emancipation of Debts Contracted for the
Purchase of Slaves, 70 Cn.-KENT L. REv. 493 (1994).
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blacks in the South struggled to protect the small amounts of land
they acquired and to defend their political rights.237 The results were
mixed. In Mississippi, lethal white violence destroyed the electoral
process and made a mockery of freedom. 238 In parts of Texas, on the
other hand, blacks were able to participate in the electoral process
longer, although ultimately violence led to disfranchisement and the
destruction of black communities. 239 In Virginia, appointment of
school board members circumvented the electoral process and al-
lowed racial discrimination to fluorish deep into the twentieth
century.240
Beyond the period of Reconstruction, the rights of southerners-
black and white-evolved and changed. The meaning of the Constitu-
tion itself, and especially the amendments adopted to protect black
freedom after the Civil War, has shifted with the political winds.241 So
too has the right to marry.24 2 Desegregation in the modem era con-
tinues to raise questions about the meaning of freedom and the
Amendments that were designed to secure freedom. 243 Debate over
the proper interpretation of the Fourtheenth Amendment has some-
times led legal scholars and judges to write, or rewrite, history to sup-
port certain policy and jurisprudential goals.2 " The continued use of
the Confederate flag creates painful memories for the descendants of
slaves while illustrating how the law of freedom can conflict with other
constitutional rights.245 Finally comparative articles, dealing with
freedom in other cultures and times, illuminate the problem of free-
dom everywhere.246 They serve to remind us that the problem of free-
dom is not unique to the United States.
CONCLUSION
In his greatest public address, Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. pro-
claimed his desire to see a world where people would be judged by the
237. Bennett, supra note 143.
238. Waldrep, supra note 143.
239. Nieman, supra note 143.
240. Peyton McCrary, Yes, But What Have They Done to Black People Lately?: The Role of
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content of their character, and when "the sons of former slaves and
the sons of former slaveholders will be able to sit down together at the
table of brotherhood. '247 He longed for "that day when all God's
children, black men and white, Jews and gentiles, Protestants and
Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old
Negro spiritual: 'Free at last. Free at last. Thank God almighty, we
are free at last.
' '' 248
In this Symposium we have explored the route from slavery to
freedom. While slavery is over, it is not so clear that freedom has
been achieved. Lord Mansfield declared he would have justice though
the heavens may fall. The heavens have not fallen, as Justice Mans-
field feared they might if slaves were free, but justice has not yet fully
been done. More than a century after Emancipation, the table of
brotherhood remains strangely empty.
247. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address during March on Washington, quoted in ADAM
FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER KNo, JR. 90-91 (1990).
248. Id.
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